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AUTHOR FINAL VERSION 
 
Alexander Wendt argued thirty years ago that a commitment to the reality of ‘unobservable 
generative structures’ would open up new avenues of causal inquiry in International Relations 
[IR] (1987: 350).  This view has since been further elaborated (see Wendt 1999; Patomäki and 
Wight 2000; Patomäki 2002; Wight 2006; Kurki 2008; Joseph and Wight 2010; Patomäki 2017) 
and has recently become quite widespread: the benefits of scientific realism [SR] are now 
propounded in the methods literature (see Bennett 2013) and even by neorealists (see 
Mearsheimer and Walt 2013).1  In fact, it is increasingly common for discussions of causal 
inquiry in IR to be framed in terms of a contrast between two competing philosophical 
positions, each with a putative methodological corollary: empiricism is associated with a 
search for patterns of cross-case covariation, while SR is associated with a search for causal 
mechanisms.2 
 
According to some more recent advocates, SR complements mainstream approaches to causal 
inquiry.  For example, Andrew Bennett argues that ‘common methods in political science – 
including but not limited to statistical analysis, formal modelling, discourse analysis, and case 
                                                          
1 SR has nothing to do with realism in IR theory.  The most prominent argument against SR in 
IR is Chernoff’s (2002). 
2 The same contrast is visible in political science (see Marsh and Furlong 2002). 
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studies – can all contribute to the development and testing of theories about causal 
mechanisms’ (2013: 471), while John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt accept that such 
theories can be tested by identifying patterns of ‘covariation’ and applying ‘techniques of 
causal inference’ (2013: 434).  For critical realists, however, SR (of which critical realism [CR] is 
a variant) underpins a profound challenge to approaches to causal inquiry organized around 
‘the study of patterns of regularities in the world around us’ (Kurki 2008: 6).  Critical realists 
argue that such approaches reflect a misunderstanding of scientific practice.  Regularities are 
significant only when observed under controlled conditions, for example, in experiments, and 
even then only because they constitute evidence of real underlying ‘causal powers’ or 
mechanisms (Kurki 2008: 198).  In order to make good on the promise of science, viz. to ‘go 
beyond appearances and provide explanations at a deeper level of understanding’ (Wight 
2006: 18), it is necessary to organize causal inquiry around identifying these underlying 
mechanisms. 
 
Although critical realists are forceful advocates of it, the idea that approaches to causal inquiry 
which focus on identifying patterns of cross-case covariation are unduly restrictive is not 
specific to SR.  It also underpins a number of recent innovations in philosophically-informed 
discussions of causality in IR which are not rooted in SR.  These include Patrick Jackson’s 
demonstration that neopositivism is not the only properly ‘scientific’ approach to empirical 
and causal inquiry in IR (2011), Ned Lebow’s concept of ‘inefficient causation’ (2014), and the 
investigations, in a recent collection on ‘Problems of Causation in World Politics’ (Humphreys 
2017a), into how causal understandings play out in contemporary world politics (see Betts and 
Pilath 2017; Guzzini 2017; Kurki 2017) and into alternatives to the philosophically discredited 
covering-law model of explanation (see Humphreys 2017b; Jackson 2017; see also Suganami 
2008, Grynaviski 2013).  A puzzle therefore emerges.  Are critical realists right to contend that 
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moving causal inquiry in IR beyond the search for regularities requires a philosophical 
revolution involving the widespread adoption of SR (Patomäki and Wight 2000; Kurki 2006)? 
 
I argue that, on this question, critical realists are wrong.  They make it appear that such a 
revolution is required by depicting SR as the principal alternative to a dominant ‘positivist, or … 
empiricist, model of social science’ (Kurki 2006: 195).  This vision of a binary confrontation 
between two philosophical systems (SR and empiricism), each with a distinctive 
methodological corollary, gives a misleading impression of what is at stake for IR in 
philosophical debates about causation.  The issue at stake in IR is not the directly philosophical 
one of whether individual researchers embrace SR for, as Fred Chernoff has argued, this will 
not necessarily affect the conduct of inquiry (2002; 2009b).  What is at stake is the 
methodological question of whether causal inquiry in IR must be organized around a focus on 
regularities (or patterns of cross-case covariation) observable in the world around us, that is, in 
everyday world politics.  And what debates about causal inquiry in IR have so far overlooked is 
that empiricists need not, and perhaps should not, endorse this focus.  As I will show, 
mainstream approaches look just as problematic from the perspective of contemporary 
empiricism as they do to scientific realists.  Far from endorsing competing methodological 
visions, empiricist and scientific realist philosophers of science share a common understanding 
of scientific practice, one from which mainstream approaches to causal inquiry in IR depart 
significantly. 
 
While empiricism (especially as it is linked to positivism) has often been a target for criticism in 
IR, most notably in the context of the ‘third debate’ (see Smith 1996), there continues to be a 
lack of clarity about what empiricism is and hence about which practices of causal inquiry in IR, 
if any, are distinctively empiricist.  Typically, critics of empiricism employ the term either as a 
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catch-all for methodological approaches to which they object (roughly, those which Jackson 
(2011) terms ‘neopositivist’) or to denote arguments associated with the logical positivist (and 
logical empiricist) movement of the early- to mid-twentieth century.3  The subsequent 
transformation in empiricist philosophy of science, led by Bas van Fraassen (1980, 1989), has 
largely been ignored (though Chernoff’s work is a notable exception (see especially 2002, 
2009b, 2014)).  My aim is therefore to develop a fuller account than has previously been 
provided in IR of Van Fraassen’s empiricism and how it differs from SR.  In light of that, I 
consider what is at stake in calls for the reconstitution of causal inquiry in IR along scientific 
realist, rather than empiricist, lines.4  I focus particularly on what role the search for 
regularities may play in causal inquiry, both because this is central to critical realist objections 
to mainstream approaches in IR, and also because critical realists argue that we can make 
progress on other questions, such as the relationship between agents and structures (see 
Wight 2006), or whether reasons can be causes (see Kurki 2008), only once we move beyond a 
narrow focus on regularities. 
 
I show that whereas critical realists suppose that empiricism entails a problematic ‘conception 
of “scientific methods”’ (Kurki 2006: 211), this is not true of Van Fraassen’s ‘constructive 
empiricism’ (1980) – his rejection of SR does not lead him to advance a competing model of 
scientific inquiry.  Any departure from the model of scientific inquiry employed in natural 
science is as much a departure from contemporary empiricism as it is from SR.  One lesson 
                                                          
3 The same is true of ‘positivism’ (see Johnson 2006: 224-5). 
4 Contemporary empiricist philosophy of science focuses on natural rather than social science.  
However, scientific realists such as Bhaskar (2008) seek to discredit empiricism as a basis for 
causal inquiry in the social sciences by showing that it cannot provide a coherent account of 
natural science.  How contemporary empiricist philosophers of science make sense of natural 
scientific practice is therefore directly relevant to the critical realist case against empiricism in 
IR. 
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which emerges from a closer appreciation of Van Fraassen’s empiricism is hence that it is not 
necessary to embrace SR in order to develop a critique, grounded in contemporary philosophy 
of science, of the pursuit of covering-law explanations and the associated focus on identifying 
patterns of cross-case covariation which dominates mainstream IR today (see Jackson 2011).  A 
second lesson, which has not been widely noticed in IR, is that approaches such as those 
articulated by Gary King, Robert Keohane, and Sidney Verba (1994), Stephen van Evera (1997), 
and John Gerring (2005), which are widely construed as ‘empiricist’ (see Kurki 2008: 103; Sil 
and Katzenstein 2010: 419), are troublingly dislocated from the philosophical position with 
which they are most often identified.5 
 
In developing this argument, I proceed as follows.  The first section summarizes the argument 
for SR and against empiricism which is employed by critical realists in IR, distinguishing its 
methodological and metaphysical components.  The second section shows how critical realists 
identify empiricism with the neopositivist methodology which dominates mainstream IR.  The 
third section introduces Van Fraassen’s ‘constructive empiricism’, showing that, in contrast to 
earlier forms of anti-realism, it differs from SR principally on a narrow epistemological issue 
about whether science requires entity realism, an issue which has no clear methodological 
corollary.  The fourth section explores the further metaphysical disagreement over whether 
science requires causal realism, questioning whether it has any substantive implications for 
causal inquiry.  The final section considers what is at stake in all this for causal inquiry in IR.  It 
argues that scientific realists in IR have failed to make a compelling case for SR as compared to 
constructive empiricism.  Yet insofar as empiricism has been transformed to meet the scientific 
realist challenge, this tends to reinforce, rather than to undermine, what I consider the critical 
                                                          
5 Johnson (2006) characterizes such work as employing a ‘positivist’ methodology.  But, as Smith (1996: 
17) points out, this is typically interpreted in IR as involving an ‘empiricist epistemology’. 
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realists’ most important argument, viz. that the methodological assumptions which appear to 
underpin most mainstream approaches to causal inquiry in IR lack philosophical support. 
 
Scientific and Critical Realism 
To be a realist about something is to hold that it is real – that it exists (Chakravartty 2011).  
Most IR theorists are therefore empirical or common-sense realists (Joseph 2007: 345-6; 
Chernoff 2009b: 373): they hold that the observable objects encountered in everyday life are 
real.  The same is true of empiricist philosophers – rejecting SR does not mean rejecting this 
kind of realism (Chernoff 2002: 191).  What is at issue between scientific realists and 
empiricists is the reality of the unobservable entities, properties, and relations (including 
causality) that feature in ordinary scientific discourse (Chernoff 2007: 400).  Scientific realists 
hold that at least some of these are real, though they disagree about which (Chakravartty 
2011) – consequently, SR can take a wide variety of forms (Chernoff 2002: 191).  Most 
scientific realists in IR, however, subscribe to both entity realism and causal realism: they 
endorse realism both about the unobservable entities postulated in our best scientific theories 
and about the putative causal powers of observable and unobservable objects. 
 
As Chernoff points out, most scientific realist philosophers of science are (like their empiricist 
counterparts) concerned with the natural rather than the social sciences.  Moreover, 
acceptance of SR in relation to well-established natural scientific theories does not entail 
acceptance of SR in the social sciences (2002: 197-8) – indeed, the relative immaturity of IR 
theories may provide an additional reason to resist realism about their theoretical postulates 
(2007: 403-4).  The most prominent form of SR in IR is, however, CR, which is a variant of SR 
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expressly developed in and for the social sciences.6  It originates principally in the work of Roy 
Bhaskar, who developed his case for SR in contradistinction to what he variously termed 
‘positivism’, ‘empiricism’, and ‘orthodox philosophy of science’ (2008: 12, 14, 15).  He 
contended that the empiricist account of the scientific method is badly flawed and that SR 
provides the solution – scientific practice is intelligible only on the assumption that what it 
discovers are the ‘generative mechanisms of nature’, that is real things, with real causal 
powers (2008: 14). 
 
The fact that most advocates of SR in IR draw on Bhaskar illuminates three features of how 
they make their case: (i) SR is presented in contradistinction to empiricism (or positivism), 
which is closely identified with a neopositivist methodology that privileges the search for 
patterns of cross-case covariation; (ii) SR is presented as the best (or only) means of moving 
beyond this neopositivist methodology; (iii) SR is presented as involving both entity realism 
and causal realism.  Because my purpose is to examine scientific realist arguments against 
empiricism in IR, I focus in what follows on the case for SR made by critical realists.7 
 
Bhaskar’s principal criticism of empiricism is that it subscribes to a ‘Humean theory of causal 
laws’, according to which ‘a constant conjunction of events’ is a ‘necessary condition for a 
scientific law’ (2008: 12).  This theory, he argues, is inadequate not only for the social sciences, 
but also as an account of natural science.  That is because it fails to distinguish between the 
                                                          
6 Chernoff notes that presentations of SR in IR often conflate SR and CR, thereby wrongly giving 
the impression that scientific realist philosophers of (natural) science would endorse the 
arguments of critical realists in IR (2007: 400). 
7 Other arguments for SR are available.  One prominent example, which has been discussed in 
IR (see Wendt 1999: 62-3; Wight 2007: 386-7; see also Chernoff 2002: 193-4), is inference to 
the best explanation.  This is rejected by Van Fraassen (1980: 19-23; see also Ladyman, 
Douven, Horsten, and Van Fraassen 1997). 
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‘closed systems’ in which constant conjunctions are found and ‘open systems’ in which they 
are not found; and this distinction is important because the world encountered in everyday 
experience is not a closed system – in fact, most closed systems are artificially created by 
scientists in experiments (Bhaskar 2008: 13-14; see also Cartwright 1999: 2-3).  Bhaskar’s point 
is that scientists conduct experiments because the world around us is mostly open-systemic: 
‘an experiment is necessary precisely to the extent that the pattern of events forthcoming 
under experimental conditions would not be forthcoming without it’ (2008: 33). 
 
It follows from this simple observation about why scientists conduct experiments that 
‘universal empirical generalizations’ are unlikely to be found (Bhaskar 2008: 15).  What Bhaskar 
terms ‘invariances’ are only ‘scientifically significant’ when ‘generated under conditions which 
are artificially produced and controlled’ (2008: 20).  And it follows from this that the idea, 
which is widespread in IR (and political science), that social scientists should search for 
regularities of the form ‘if A then always B’, or ‘if A then sometimes B, with probability X’ (Van 
Evera 1997: 8), must be flawed, at least if such regularities are held to apply both under 
controlled conditions and also in everyday life.8  For although we may identify deterministic or 
probabilistic relationships between particular experimental manipulations and particular 
outcomes, we do not expect these relationships to hold outside controlled conditions.  
Consider, for example, the effect of gravity on a falling feather: inside a vacuum chamber, the 
feather falls at the same rate as a bowling ball but, because of atmospheric resistance, we do 
not expect this to be replicated in everyday conditions.  We could only expect regularities 
observed under controlled conditions also to hold outside those conditions if the world around 
us were a closed system – but in that case, it would not be necessary to conduct experiments. 
                                                          
8 Cartwright (1983) argues that while fundamental laws in physics do state universal 
regularities, in doing so they ‘lie’. 
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As I have presented Bhaskar’s position so far, his point is methodological: insofar as empiricism 
identifies causal inquiry with the search for regularities (or patterns of covariation) that extend 
outside of controlled conditions, it fails to recognize the crucial role of experimentation within 
scientific practice.  This argument is, however, closely tied to a transcendental argument for SR 
– Bhaskar holds that the way in which scientists employ experimental results is intelligible only 
on a scientific realist understanding of what they discover in experiments.  In short, his 
contention that empiricism is methodologically incoherent informs an argument for both 
entity and causal realism. 
 
He advances this argument by pointing out a commonplace supposition that, he argues, 
informs scientific practice: that although the precise ‘pattern of events’ observed under 
controlled conditions does not extend outside those conditions, the causal relationship of 
which the pattern is evidence does (2008: 13).  Consider, once again, the example of the 
feather dropped in the vacuum chamber.  We do not expect the result observed therein to be 
replicated in everyday conditions.  Yet nor do we infer from this that gravity is only present 
under experimental conditions.  We suppose that gravity is also present in everyday 
conditions, but recognize that the outcome observed under these conditions will reflect how it 
contingently combines with precisely those factors, such as atmospheric resistance, that are 
controlled for in the vacuum chamber. 
 
Bhaskar argues that this supposition (viz. causes continue to exert effects outside of the 
controlled conditions under which they are identified) is intelligible only if the invariances 
observed under experimental conditions are themselves produced by ‘generative mechanisms 
of nature’ (2008: 14).  Under experimental conditions, these mechanisms generate invariant 
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results because they are allowed to unfold unhindered.  Outside of such conditions, they 
continue to act, but the consequences which would be observed under experimental 
conditions ‘are, owing to the operation of intervening mechanisms or countervailing causes, 
unrealized’ (2008: 46).  In other words, Bhaskar argues that the ‘exportation of explanations’ 
(Clarke 2010: 301) from experimental conditions to everyday conditions is intelligible only if 
experiments identify something which carries across to open systems.  This cannot be 
regularities, because the invariant results observed under experimental conditions are not 
reproduced outside those conditions.  What is discovered must, therefore, be ‘the ways of 
acting of things’, that is, real causal powers, possessed by real observable and unobservable 
entities, which both account for invariances observed under experimental conditions and also 
constitute the ‘mechanisms’ that ‘combine to generate the actual flux of phenomena’ 
observed in open systems (Bhaskar 2008: 17). 
 
In subsequent work, Bhaskar (2015) built this argument for SR into CR, an approach to causal 
inquiry in the social sciences which takes seriously the emergent reality of social formations 
and the need to study the ‘persistent relations between the various planes of activity that 
constitute, and causally impact upon, social life’ (Wight 2006: 48).9  For my purposes, however, 
it is the basic argument for SR, and how it is contrasted with empiricism which is of principal 
interest.  And my point, at this stage, is that the two parts of Bhaskar’s argument are 
separable.  We can coherently accept the substance of his methodological point, viz. the kinds 
of regularities prized by scientists are mostly discovered through experiment and do not hold 
outside experimental conditions, while rejecting his claim that only SR can render the role of 
                                                          
9 Those more recent advocates of SR, such as Bennett (2013) and Mearsheimer and Walt 
(2013), who regard SR as compatible with, and making sense of, mainstream research 
practices in IR do not follow Bhaskar and the self-identified critical realists down this path. 
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experimentation in science intelligible.  This is significant because it raises the question of what 
is really at stake in the scientific realist critique of empiricism in IR – is it a methodological 
critique of mainstream IR, or a philosophical argument for SR? 
 
Scientific realist criticisms of empiricism in IR 
Critical realists in IR follow Bhaskar in conceiving of empiricism as being unable adequately to 
make sense of scientific practice.  They therefore consider causal inquiry informed by 
empiricist principles to be methodologically suspect – developing Bhaskar’s claim that 
‘empiricism is not neutral in its consequences for scientific practice’ (2008: 42), they associate 
it with what Jackson terms a ‘neopositivist’ search for patterns of cross-case covariation 
(2011). 
 
I examine three areas in which they contend that empiricists give an inadequate account of 
scientific practice: in relation to (i) the objects of scientific inquiry, (ii) the interpretation of 
scientific theories, and (iii) how science explains.  In the following section, I show that while 
these arguments may hold force against the neopositivist assumptions which shape causal 
inquiry in mainstream IR, they are powerless against Van Fraassen’s reformulated empiricism, 
which does not endorse those assumptions.  This suggests that what is at stake in philosophical 
debates around causality in IR is not a philosophical question about the merits of SR as 
compared to empiricism, but rather a methodological question about the merits of dominant 
practices of causal inquiry in IR. 
 
Chernoff has previously criticized arguments against empiricism and other anti-realist positions 
by scientific realists in IR, contending that they often mischaracterize debates in contemporary 
philosophy of science (2002: 196-9; see also 2007; 2009b; 2014: 34-8).  However, he defends 
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‘causal conventionalism’ (2009a; 2009b), which combines Van Fraassen’s treatment of 
theoretical terms (2002: 202; 2009b: 374) with positions that Van Fraassen would not endorse, 
notably instrumentalism (2002; 2009b) and causal realism (2002: 203; 2009a: 177; 2009b: 
383).  By contrast, I focus more narrowly on Van Fraassen’s defence of an empiricism which 
resists both entity and causal realism, but without embracing instrumentalism. 
 
The objects of scientific inquiry 
Like Bhaskar, Milja Kurki identifies empiricism with a ‘Humean conception of causation’ (2008: 
6) which implies that ‘causal relations are regularity relations of patterns of observables’, such 
that ‘when A type of events take place, B type of events can be assumed to follow (at least 
probabilistically)’.  Consequently, causal analysis is tied ‘to the study of patterns of regularities 
in the world around us’ (2008: 6).  Like Bhaskar, moreover, she regards this conception of 
causation as ontologically impoverished.  She insists that ‘observed regularities do not 
constitute causality: causality consists in the underlying causal powers’ which regularities 
observed under experimental conditions allow us to identify (2008: 198).  In other words, the 
objects of scientific inquiry are not, as empiricists think, regularities, but rather real causal 
powers. 
 
According to Kurki, this matters because it has methodological consequences.  The impact of 
the empiricist conception of causation on the social sciences has been the development of an 
understanding of science as being ‘about finding falsifiable, predictive, observation-based 
regularities’ – ‘most social scientists are … adamant that only careful observation of 
regularities (even if of “localised” regularities) can give us an adequate understanding of 
human action and society’ (2006: 193-4).  Kenneth Waltz, for example, claimed that in order to 
construct a ‘theory of international politics’ one must first ‘conceive of international politics as 
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a bounded realm or domain; second … discover some law-like regularities within it; and third … 
develop a way of explaining the observed regularities’ (1979: 116).  Consequently, Kurki 
argues, empiricists are unable to do justice to causes which are unobservable or which do not 
show up in stable regularities, such as ‘ideas, meanings and reasons’ (2006: 203; see also 
Shapiro and Wendt 1992; Wight 2006).  This has led to a methodological divide in IR in which, 
rather than submitting to the ‘straightjacket’ which a focus on regularities imposes upon 
causal inquiry, many interpretive and critical scholars have ‘rejected the validity of causal 
analysis altogether’ (2006: 200).  Kurki argues, however, that because SR accepts ‘[r]easons 
and motivations as well as rules, norms and discourses’ as ‘legitimate objects’ of social 
scientific inquiry it can ‘help forge constructive links between theoretical camps in the “divided 
discipline” of IR’ (2006: 211, 190; see also Patomäki and Wight 2000). 
 
One putative problem with treating regularities as the principal objects of scientific inquiry is 
hence that it renders empiricism unable to support inquiry into kinds of unobservable factors 
that are widely encountered in the social world.  However, Kurki’s characterization of 
empiricism as searching for regularities in the world around us also raises a further question, 
viz. what is the warrant for believing that such regularities are causally significant?  We know 
that regularities observed in artificially closed experimental conditions are causally significant 
because when the interference of other factors is ruled out, the factor that is manipulated is 
the only thing that could have produced the observed outcome (see Bhaskar 2008: 53; 
Cartwright 1983: 6).  This logic can also be applied to randomized controlled trials and to 
natural experiments.10  Outside of such conditions, however, we cannot be sure that any 
                                                          
10 In a randomized controlled trial, if treatment and control groups are identical, then only the 
treatment could have generated any difference in the observed outcome across the two 
groups (Holland 1986; see also Cartwright 2010).  Similarly, if John Stuart Mill’s method of 
difference is applied to two cases that are ‘alike in every way except one’, then we have a 
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regular pattern which may be observed is not a product of chance, or of equifinality (of there 
being multiple possible causal routes to the same outcome).  Consequently, the covariation of 
two factors does not strictly imply the presence of a causal relationship between them – we 
can draw compelling inferences about causal relationships only from patterns of covariation 
observed under controlled conditions (whether artificial or naturally occurring).  This applies 
even to probabilistic laws: a pattern of covariation definitively indicates the presence of a 
causal law which holds probabilistically only if it can be shown to hold probabilistically under 
controlled conditions.11 
 
The interpretation of scientific theories 
Critical realists also reject what they take to be an empiricist interpretation of scientific 
theories.  For while Kurki argues that its focus on regularities renders empiricism unable to do 
justice to unobservable factors, many widely accepted scientific theories do in fact invoke 
unobservable entities, such as sub-atomic particles.  According to Colin Wight (2007), the 
instrumental fashion in which empiricists make sense of this feature of science restricts the 
scope of causal inquiry. 
 
Instrumentalism is the doctrine that theoretical claims about unobservable entities should be 
interpreted instrumentally – as purely theoretical assumptions which (i) do not have truth 
values (and hence do not make existential assertions) and (ii) are included in scientific theories 
purely based on their contribution to explanatory and predictive success (Chakravartty 2007: 
                                                          
natural experiment in which the factor which differs must be the cause of the outcome to be 
explained (Sekhon 2004: 283). 
11 There is therefore a significant difference between a pattern observed under everyday 
conditions, in which Bs sometimes, but not always, follow As, and a probabilistic law, in which 
Bs follow As with a specified probability, under controlled conditions. 
15 
 
10-11).  Its potential appeal is that it appears to make sense of the explanatory power of 
scientific theories in which assumptions about unobservable entities appear without requiring 
a commitment to entity realism.  Scientific realists argue, however, that instrumentalism has a 
significant methodological cost.  Because instrumentalists deny that theoretical assumptions 
about unobservable entities refer to anything real, when they invoke theories containing those 
assumptions in explanations they must reason in an ‘as-if’ fashion (Wendt 1999: 61) – they can 
explain only that what happened was as if the theory’s assumptions were true.  Consequently, 
the unobservable entities which those assumptions postulate never themselves become 
objects of investigation.  Whereas scientific realists will question whether such entities are 
indeed as described in scientific theories, instrumentalism forecloses this avenue of inquiry 
(Wight 2007: 381, 383, 393-4).  In short, instrumentalism makes science ‘conservative’: by 
exempting knowledge claims about unobservables ‘from criticism’, it limits the scope of 
scientific inquiry (Bhaskar 2008: 42-3). 
 
Waltz’s conception of the structure of the international political system constitutes the most 
widely discussed example of this problem in IR.  Waltz argued that theoretical ‘assumptions 
are not assertions of fact.  They are neither true nor false.  Theoretical notions find their 
justification in the success of the theories that employ them’ (1979: 6).  Scientific realists 
contend that the deficiencies of this instrumentalism emerge in the substance of neorealist 
theory.  Wendt (1987) argues that Waltz’s definition of structure in terms of the distribution of 
capabilities among functionally equal units in an anarchic system (see Waltz 1979: 88-99) 
effectively reduces it to a property of states, viz. their capabilities.  This is adequate for Waltz’s 
purposes insofar as it enables him to distinguish between bipolar and multipolar systems and 
hence to articulate his central theoretical claim: that the former are more stable than the 
latter.  Wendt argues, however, that Waltz’s definition leaves neorealism unable to illuminate 
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how structure might help to generate states as actors (1987).  In short, because Waltz treats 
structure as a theoretical instrument the incorporation of which into neorealist theory is 
justified purely by its contribution to the prediction of system-wide outcomes, he fails to 
explore its generative potential. 
 
How science explains 
A third aspect of empiricism which is widely criticized on methodological grounds is its 
approach to explanation.  This is typically assumed to be some version of Carl Hempel’s 
covering-law model, according to which we explain an event, B, by showing that its having 
occurred is logically deducible from the premises (i) that there is a well-established (covering) 
law of the form if A, then B and (ii) that A occurred, such that the occurrence of B was ‘to be 
expected in the circumstances’ (1966: 48; see also Wendt 1999: 79; Suganami 2008: 330).  In 
IR, for example, James Lee Ray asserts that to explain a particular event it is necessary to show 
it to be ‘an example of an established general pattern’ (1995: 138). 
 
Wendt identifies two ways in which this model of explanation ‘can negatively affect the 
practice of social science’.  First, social scientists may prioritize the search for ‘the behavioural 
laws ostensibly needed for causal explanations’ over other forms of inquiry (1999: 80).  This 
corresponds to Kurki’s concern that prioritizing the search for regularities places causal inquiry 
in a methodological straitjacket.  Second, social scientists may ‘turn to false, “as if” 
assumptions as substitutes for the laws which we have not yet discovered’ (1999: 80).  This 
corresponds to Wight’s concerns about the dangers of instrumentalism.  Yet Wendt also 
objects to the covering-law model itself.  He observes that ‘subsumption under a law is not 
really explanation at all, in the sense of answering why something occurred, but is simply a 
way of saying that it is an instance of a regularity’ (1999: 81; see also Suganami 2008: 331).  In 
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short, the covering-law model of explanation does not tell us what we want to know – it tells 
us only why something might have been expected to occur, not what caused it to occur.  In 
order to explain why something occurred, Wendt argues, ‘we need to show how a causal 
process works, which depends on knowing mechanisms’ (1999: 81). 
 
Van Fraassen’s ‘constructive empiricism’ 
If construed as being directed against particular methodological practices and assumptions in 
mainstream IR, these arguments are, I contend, very important.  Focusing on identifying 
regularities in the world around us and treating unobservable entities instrumentally are 
indeed liable to restrict the scope of causal inquiry, while the covering-law model of 
explanation cannot be sustained.12  It is, however, a further question whether this tells us 
anything about the intrinsic limitations of empiricism as a philosophical position.  Critical 
realists’ contention that it does underpins their advocacy of a philosophical revolution in which 
empiricism is replaced by SR – if empiricism has these methodological corollaries (and if SR is 
the only plausible alternative), then broadening the scope of causal inquiry in IR will require 
empiricism to be abandoned in favour of SR.  Yet this contention is dubious.  Indeed, such 
support as critical realists provide for their claim that empiricism entails the methodological 
practices and assumptions they criticize involves identifying empiricism with now largely 
defunct positions such as ‘logical empiricism’ (see Shapiro and Wendt 1992; Wendt 1999).13 
                                                          
12 My point is not that there is no merit in searching for regularities in the world around us, but 
rather that limiting causal inquiry to the search for such regularities closes down other 
potentially productive avenues of inquiry.  Even if we accept that patterns of cross-case 
covariation may constitute powerful evidence of causal relationships, it does not follow from 
this that all causal relationships show up in such patterns, nor that such patterns constitute the 
only possible evidence for causal relationships.   
13 Bhaskar acknowledged that his arguments depicted an idealized form of empiricism to 
which, even if the 1970s, ‘few, if any, modern philosophers’ would unambiguously subscribe 
(2008: 26). 
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Such characterizations of empiricism are not widely challenged in IR – as in the so-called ‘third 
debate’, empiricism (like positivism) continues to be a term employed principally by critics of 
mainstream IR to denote positions they reject.  Both mainstream scholars and their scientific 
realist critics have ignored the transformation in empiricist philosophy of science wrought 
since the 1970s, principally by Van Fraassen (cf Chernoff 2002).  His key work remains The 
Scientific Image (1980), which seeks to identify what form a coherent empiricist account of 
science must take and how it differs from the forms of SR then being defended in the 
philosophy of science.  More recently, Van Fraassen has explored the nature of philosophical 
stances (2002) and the nature of scientific representation (2008).  However, the arguments 
which are most relevant to the critical realist characterization of the empiricist approach to 
causal inquiry in IR are to be found in The Scientific Image and his subsequent defence and 
development of that position (see 1985, 1989, 2001). 
 
When mentioned in IR, Van Fraassen is typically identified as a positivist (Wight 2007: 388) or 
an instrumentalist (Wendt 1999: 61; Jackson 2011: 80).  This characterization is, however, 
inaccurate.  Van Fraassen explicitly acknowledges the deficiencies of previous forms of anti-
realism, including phenomenalism, conventionalism, fictionalism, logical empiricism, logical 
positivism, and instrumentalism.  He also accepts that many of the ‘realist arguments’ against 
those positions were ‘correct and successful: the positivist picture of science no longer seems 
tenable’ (1980: 2, 10, 41).  The form of empiricism which he presents in its place does depart in 
important respects from SR.  Yet these differences do not have the methodological 
consequences which scientific realists in IR expect (see also Chernoff 2007: 404-7; 2009b: 380; 
2014: 256).  The reader may therefore wonder what significance they have for IR.  If so, then I 
beg patience – it is precisely the similarities between SR and constructive empiricism which I 
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consider significant, for they bring into the question the critical realist claim that it matters for 
causal inquiry in IR whether those conducting the inquiry are scientific realists or empiricists.  
 
Constructive empiricism and the objects of scientific inquiry: 
Van Fraassen asserts that science aims to ‘save the phenomena’ and that ‘regularities in the 
observable phenomena’ are ‘the scientist’s basic topic of concern’ (1980: 4, 70).  This makes 
him sound as if he holds the kind of view critical realists in IR reject.  However, he joins with 
scientific realists in philosophy of science by rejecting what he, following Wilfrid Sellars, terms 
the ‘levels picture’ – a picture of science which ‘pervades positivist writings’ and in which 
‘singular observable facts (“this crow is black”) are scientifically explained by general 
observable regularities (“all crows are black”) which in turn are explained by highly theoretical 
hypotheses’.  ‘We do not really expect [scientific] theories to “save” our everyday 
generalizations’, Van Fraassen observes, ‘for we ourselves have no confidence in their strict 
universality’.  In everyday life, ‘we are liable to find only putative laws heavily subject to 
unwritten ceteris paribus qualifications’: ‘all crows are black – except albinos; water boils at 
100°C – provided atmospheric pressure is normal; a falling body accelerates – provided it is not 
intercepted … and so forth’ (1980: 32; see also Cartwright 1983: 89). 
 
In short, science does not principally consist in a search for regularities in the world round us.  
In order to discover the kinds of regularities scientists are interested in, Van Fraassen argues, 
‘one needs experimentation’ (1980: 73ff).  He notes, moreover, that these kinds of regularities 
‘are exceedingly subtle and complex, so experimental design is exceedingly difficult’.  
Consequently, ‘the very search for new and deeper empirical regularities becomes couched in 
theoretical language’ (1980: 73).  His point is that even if we conceive of science as searching 
for regularities, this often requires developing and testing theories which make assumptions 
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about unobservable entities and forces – ‘[s]cience presents a picture of the world which is 
much richer in content than what the unaided eye discerns’ (1980: 59). 
 
Consequently, although Van Fraassen characterizes science as aiming to discover ‘regularities 
in the observable part of the world’ (1980: 73), this does not have the implications that critical 
realists might imagine.  Because Van Fraassen does not endorse the search for regularities in 
everyday life, questions about their significance for causal inquiry do not arise.  And while he is 
not directly concerned with the social sciences, there is no prima facie reason to suppose that 
unobservable factors in the social sciences are further beyond the scope of scientific inquiry 
than are those in the natural sciences.  That said, Van Fraassen’s acknowledgement that 
scientific theories often refer to unobservables raises the question of how he interprets such 
theories, a question which gets to the heart of constructive empiricism and how it differs from 
SR.  Yet his position is not what might be supposed given the frequent claim, in IR, that 
instrumentalism is the principal alternative to SR (see Wendt 1987: 350; Wight 2007; 
Mearsheimer and Walt 2013: 432-4). 
 
Constructive empiricism and the interpretation of scientific theories 
Van Fraassen characterizes the core of SR as follows:  
Science aims to give us, in its theories, a literally true story of what the world is like; 
and acceptance of a scientific theory involves the belief that it is [approximately] true.  
(1980: 8)14 
                                                          
14 I follow Chakravartty (2007: 4-8) in qualifying ‘true’ as ‘approximately true’ because, as Van 
Fraassen acknowledges (1980: 7), SR does not imply that our current theories are in fact 
correct or even that ‘science will arrive in due time at theories true in all respects' – the key 
realist claim is that science is an ‘enterprise of discovery’ aimed at revealing ‘what there really 
is’ in the world. 
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He points out, however, that while all anti-realists must reject some part of this position, they 
have two options: they can either reject the idea that scientific theories should be literally 
construed or reject the idea that accepting a literally construed theory requires belief that it is 
true (1980: 10).  Whereas the first option is instrumentalist, on Van Fraassen’s view ‘the 
apparent statements of science really are statements, capable of being true or false’ – if a 
theory’s statements include ‘There are electrons’, then the theory implies the existence of 
electrons (1980: 10-11).  He therefore pursues the second option.15  He agrees with scientific 
realists (against instrumentalists) that scientific theories should be construed literally, that is, 
as making existential assertions about unobservable entities, but insists that construing a 
theory literally  
relates not at all to our epistemic attitudes towards theories, nor to the aim we pursue 
in constructing theories, but only to the correct understanding of what a theory says … 
After deciding that the language of science must be literally understood, we can still 
say that there is no need to believe good theories to be true, nor to believe ipso facto 
that the entities they postulate are real.  (1980: 11-12) 
In other words, scientists can accept a theory and construe it literally while at the same time 
‘“bracketing” its ontological implications’ (1980: 81). 
 
On first inspection, this may sound unpersuasive.  Most scientists, we may suppose, are entity 
realists – they believe (some of) the theories they accept to be true and hence believe that 
(some of) the unobservable entities to which they refer exist.  Yet Van Fraassen would accept 
this!  He is not concerned with what scientists in fact believe, but rather with whether it is 
                                                          
15 Whereas Chernoff defends instrumentalism, but denies that it has the methodological 
consequences scientific realists in IR expect (2002, 2007, 2009b), Van Fraassen rejects 
instrumentalism – his point is that empiricists need not (and should not) be instrumentalists. 
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necessary, for science, that scientists believe the theories they accept to be true in what they 
say about the unobservable parts of the world.  His view is that the extent of belief required 
for theory acceptance is less than scientific realists suggest – scientists can coherently resist 
entity realism by remaining ‘agnostic about the existence of the unobservable aspects of the 
world described by science’ (1980: 72).16 
 
Van Fraassen therefore presents an alternative account of theory acceptance.  Accepting a 
theory must, he notes, involve belief that it is ‘empirically adequate’ – that it is true in ‘what it 
says about the observable things and events in the world’ (1980: 12).  No scientist can accept a 
theory that they do not believe at least to this extent.  Accepting a theory also involves ‘a 
commitment to confront any future phenomena’ with the ‘conceptual resources’ which that 
theory provides (1980: 12).  This commitment compels scientists to ‘immerse’ themselves in 
the ‘world-picture’ the theory constructs and also in its language, including language which 
indexes unobservable entities (1980: 81) – scientists will therefore respond to questions about 
the world in the language of and by reference to the picture given by the theories they accept.  
Van Fraassen insists however, that scientists can believe that a theory is the best available (out 
of those which are empirically adequate), and hence commit to it and employ its language in 
talking about the world, yet still maintain an open mind about whether it is true in what it says 
                                                          
16 Some parts of the world which cannot be perceived by our senses may nonetheless be 
detected with the aid of scientific instruments (and theories for interpreting what they show).  
Consequently, scientific realists argue that we can be certain about the existence of some 
unobservable entities, viz. those which are ‘detectable’ (Chakravartty 2007: 14; see also 
Jackson 2011: 85-7).  Van Fraassen insists, however, that detection is not observation (1980: 
16-17; 2001: 154), implying that scientists can coherently remain agnostic about the existence 
even of ‘detectable unobservables’. 
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about the unobservable parts of the world.17  He therefore offers the following summary 
statement of constructive empiricism, which is intended to bring out the contrast with SR: 
Science aims to give us theories which are empirically adequate; and acceptance of a 
theory involves as belief only that it is empirically adequate.  (1980: 12) 
 
The difference between SR and constructive empiricism is therefore subtle – it concerns the 
extent of belief required for theory acceptance in science.  Van Fraassen argues that 
acceptance requires belief only that a theory is empirically adequate and not, as scientific 
realists argue, belief that the theory is true simpliciter.  In other words, acceptance of a theory 
which makes truth claims about unobservable entities does not require a commitment to 
entity realism – agnosticism about the reality of the unobservable entities to which many 
scientific theories refer is permitted.  He also notes one important reason for thinking that 
agnosticism is sufficient for science, viz. if a theory is true in what it says about unobservable 
entities, that makes no difference to its empirical content, as compared to it being empirically 
adequate – ‘we can have evidence for the truth of a theory only via evidential support for its 
empirical adequacy’.  Consequently, he argues, belief that a theory is not only empirically 
adequate, but also true in what it says about unobservables is ‘supererogatory’ – scientists 
may believe what theories say about unobservables, but it makes no difference for, and hence 
                                                          
17 An anonymous reviewer suggested that while Van Fraassen may not be an instrumentalist 
about the assumptions within scientific theories (because he regards them as having truth 
values) he is, nonetheless, an instrumentalist about theories themselves (insofar as he holds 
that they should be evaluated on grounds other than their truth), which makes him a kind of 
pragmatist.  Van Fraassen acknowledges that there is a ‘pragmatic aspect’ to theory 
acceptance, because it comes with a commitment ‘to seeing nature’ through a ‘theory’s eyes’ 
– an accepted theory is a ‘guide both to theoretical and practical life’ (2001: 164; see also 
1980: 87-8).  His key claim, though, is that while scientific theories do make truth claims about 
the unobservable entities to which they refer (which rules out instrumentalism), we cannot 
directly evaluate them – consequently, we can accept theories which make such claims as 
guides while withholding belief that those claims are true. 
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is not necessary for, science (1985: 255).18  Significantly, it follows from this that there is no 
theory which a realist-inclined scientist can accept which an agnostic cannot accept.  This is 
because a theory which is (believed to be) true and is hence acceptable to the former is also, 
therefore, (believed to be) empirically adequate and is hence equally acceptable to the latter. 
 
This view does not have the negative methodological consequences which scientific realists 
attribute to instrumentalism.  Recall that both Bhaskar and Wight regard empiricism as 
conservative.  As Wight puts it: the ‘realism principle (“is it really the case?”) provides the 
motor which keeps science running’ – science progresses in part by developing new theories 
and exposing the entities they postulate to critical scrutiny (2007: 383; see also Bhaskar 2008: 
15-16; Patomäki and Wight 2000: 218).  Van Fraassen notes, however, that ‘there have always 
been reasons to doubt the empirical adequacy of extant theories’ (1980: 93; see also Chernoff 
2007: 402).  One reason for this is that a theory which is claimed to be empirically adequate is 
claimed to be true of all the observable parts of the world, including parts not yet observed 
(1980: 72).19  A science which aims to develop theories which are empirically adequate will 
therefore not, as Wight suggests, prematurely ‘come to an end’ (2007: 383), but will rather be 
perpetually committed to devising new and ever more sophisticated tests of the empirical 
adequacy of its theories. 
 
                                                          
18 An empiricist may, therefore, believe in the reality of (some) unobservables, so long as she 
acknowledges that this belief is supererogatory. 
19 As van Fraassen acknowledges, this means that accepting a theory requires an 
epistemological commitment that extends beyond the evidence.  He denies, however, that this 
opens the door to SR, for ‘it is not an epistemological principle that one might as well hang for 
a sheep as for a lamb’ (1980: 72). 
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These tests may, moreover, include tests of assumptions about unobservable entities.  Making 
the case that causal inquiry in IR should focus on causal mechanisms, and hence should 
embrace SR, Bennett notes that theories involving unobservable entities 
generate implications on what should be true in the observable world if the posited 
mechanisms and our instruments of observation operate in the manner that we 
theorize.  We can test these observable implications … even though we cannot directly 
observe mechanisms.  (2013: 466) 
This could have been written by a constructive empiricist, rather than a proponent of SR, for to 
test the observable implications of a theory that postulates an unobservable entity is precisely 
to test its empirical adequacy.  For reasons I examine below, Van Fraassen is reluctant to 
embrace the term ‘causal mechanism’ to characterize such entities.  Constructive empiricism 
nonetheless endorses scientists making unobservable entities objects of inquiry in the only 
way that is possible – by constructing, and testing the empirical adequacy of, theories which 
invoke them. 
 
Constructive empiricism and how science explains 
Whereas scientific realists in IR associate empiricism with the covering-law model of 
explanation, Van Fraassen rejects it on grounds similar to Wendt’s.  He notes that, according to 
the covering-law model, an explanation must afford ‘good grounds for believing that the 
phenomenon [to be explained] did, or does, occur’, but objects that this ‘does not always 
amount to explanation’ (1980: 104).  On his own account, by contrast, ‘science gives us a 
picture of the world as a net of interconnected events, related to each other in a complex but 
orderly way’, such that we can conceive of an event we are seeking to explain as being 
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‘enmeshed in a net of causal relations’.20  In order to explain that event, it is necessary to pick 
out the most ‘salient factors’ from within this ‘causal net’ – these constitute ‘(what are 
ordinarily called) the cause(s) of that event’ (1980: 123-4).21  Van Fraassen therefore conceives 
of (causal) explanations as drawing on the world-picture provided by our best scientific 
theories to provide an account of why something occurred – and if those theories invoke 
unobservable entities, then such entities may, on Van Fraassen’s account, be identified as 
causes of the outcome to be explained. 
 
There is, however, a difference in the inferences that scientific realists and constructive 
empiricists believe can be derived from explanations that refer to unobservable entities.  
Nancy Cartwright is a causal realist whose arguments speak directly to the case against 
empiricism advanced by critical realists in IR.  She argues, against Van Fraassen, that ‘causal 
explanations have truth built into them’ – to the extent that we find a causal explanation 
acceptable, ‘we must believe in the [reality of the] causes described’ (1983: 91, 5).22  In other 
words, if we accept an explanation which invokes an unobservable entity, then that implies a 
commitment to the reality of that entity.  Van Fraassen disagrees.  He points out that 
explanations are always relative to some theory and argues that the fact that a theory can 
explain some outcome is not a reason to believe it to be true (1980: 100).  In other words, we 
                                                          
20 Van Fraassen in fact questions the ‘adequacy of the terminology of cause and causality’ to 
describe the picture science gives us (1980: 123-4).  He does, however, accept that use of this 
terminology constitutes a normal part of science.  I discuss this further below.  
21 Van Fraassen’s analysis of explanation focuses on how we determine which are the salient 
factors; he argues that an explanation is best understood as ‘an answer to a why-question’ 
(1980: 134) and hence that salience is pragmatically determined.  On the significance of this 
insight for the evaluation of competing causal explanations in IR see Grynaviski (2013), 
Chernoff (2014), and Humphreys (2017b). 
22 On the utility of Cartwright’s distinction between identifying causes and putting them to 
work in causal explanations for thinking about the nature of causal explanation in IR see 
Jackson (2017). 
27 
 
can accept an explanation which invokes an unobservable entity while remaining agnostic 
about whether that entity exists.  This difference does not, however, lead constructive 
empiricists to offer different explanations than scientific realists do (cf Chernoff 2014: 256) – 
they differ over the extent of belief science requires in the theories on which explanations 
draw, not over the world-picture those theories generate. 
 
Regularities and causal powers 
The preceding analysis suggests that constructive empiricism differs from SR far less strongly 
than is suggested by scientific realist arguments against empiricism in IR.  Van Fraassen 
describes scientists as (i) immersed in theories which (ii) typically go beyond what is 
observable and (iii) are developed largely through experimentation.  He also notes (iv) that 
these theories provide the scientific world-picture that is put to work in explanations.  He 
agrees with scientific realists (v) that any claims such theories make about unobservable 
entities must be construed literally, but notes (vi) that belief that such theories are not only 
empirically adequate but also true in what they say about unobservable entities makes no 
difference to the evidence which counts in favour of them and hence argues (vii) that such 
belief is supererogatory.  What makes this a distinctively empiricist position is neither the 
scientific method nor the theoretical world-picture it commends, but rather its epistemological 
modesty (see 1985; 2002) – Van Fraassen interprets science as requiring less belief for theory 
acceptance than scientific realists do, and hence denies that it requires a commitment to 
entity realism.  Like SR, however, constructive empiricism is ‘non-revisionary’ with regard to 
scientific practice – it aims to render that practice philosophically intelligible, but does not seek 
to change it (Rosen 1994: 156).  Consequently, constructive empiricism and SR offer competing 
interpretations of scientific practice, not competing prescriptions for it. 
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Nonetheless, a puzzle remains.  Van Fraassen’s characterization of science as seeking to 
discover regularities may not have the methodological implications that critical realists 
suppose, but it contrasts sharply with Bhaskar’s argument that science is intelligible only if the 
invariances discovered in experiments are construed as evidence of underlying causal powers.  
Van Fraassen argues, in effect, that science may be understood as merely identifying 
regularities – that we are not compelled to construe these regularities as the manifestation of 
underlying causal powers.  In other words, he seeks to resist not only entity realism, but also 
causal realism (see 1980; 1989). 
 
I do not seek to resolve this debate.  Rather, the question I consider is how much of a 
difference for causal inquiry these competing metaphysical stances make, when considered in 
their own right.  This question has received hardly any attention in IR, for the presumption, 
among critical realists, has been that the metaphysical disagreements between empiricists and 
scientific realists will be accompanied by methodological differences, differences which will 
handicap an empiricist approach to causal inquiry.  Yet Van Fraassen argues that we can, 
without cost, sidestep metaphysical issues.  In other words, whereas Bhaskar argues that we 
can only make sense of the practice of science on the supposition that causal powers are real, 
Van Fraassen argues that we can do without this supposition and still get on with the business 
of science.  If so, then this further undermines the contention that embracing SR will open up 
new avenues of causal inquiry, as compared to empiricism. 
 
Van Fraassen recognizes, of course, that ‘when scientists describe the world they do so in 
causal discourse’ (1993: 438).  When explaining what their theories show, for example, 
scientists often use causal terminology, describing theoretical models as containing ‘causal 
mechanisms’ (1980: 80) and describing the picture of the world given by science and put to 
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work in explanations in causal terms (1980: 123-4).  But Van Fraassen questions whether this 
reveals anything about the world as it is independent of science.  He identifies an alternative 
possibility – scientists’ causal discourse might describe ‘features of our models, not features of 
the world’ (1989: 214).  In other words, scientists’ causal discourse may be just a way of talking 
about what science shows, a way of talking that does not in fact latch on to any feature of the 
world as it is independent of science.  However, this is not an argument for causal idealism – 
Van Fraassen does not deny that causal powers are real (1993: 435).23  Rather, he defends an 
agnostic position, withholding judgement on whether scientists’ causal discourse latches onto 
features of the world as it is independent of science.24   
 
In defending this agnosticism Van Fraassen advances two arguments which speak to Bhaskar’s 
position.  First, whereas Bhaskar argues that invariances observed under experimental 
conditions are explained by the operation of underlying causal powers, Van Fraassen rejects 
‘the demand for an explanation’ of such regularities, ‘by means of truths concerning a reality 
beyond what is actual and observable, as a demand which plays no role in the scientific 
enterprise’ (1980: 203).  He is happy simply to say: ‘that the observable phenomena exhibit 
these regularities … is merely a brute fact, and may or may not have an explanation in terms of 
unobservable facts “behind the phenomena”’ (1980: 24).  He points out that if we do ask what 
explains these regularities, then in order to avoid an infinite regress (viz. what explains what 
explains the regularities?, etc.) it will be necessary to postulate, behind the regularities, some 
natural properties which do not themselves require explanation.  But in that case, he observes, 
there will always be something left unexplained (1980: 205-7, 213).  In short, causal realists 
and agnostics stop in a different place – whereas causal realists seek to explain why there are 
                                                          
23 For a defence of causal idealism in IR see Lebow (2014). 
24 He is therefore not guilty of what Bhaskar (2008: 36) terms an ‘epistemic fallacy’. 
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regularities but consider it unnecessary to explain why there are causal powers, Van Fraassen 
considers it unnecessary to explain why there are regularities. 
 
Second, whereas Bhaskar holds that the exportation of experimental results to everyday 
settings is intelligible only on the supposition that experiments identify real causal powers, Van 
Fraassen denies that science’s success in manipulating the world requires explaining.  He is 
happy to observe simply that ‘[o]nly the successful theories survive – the ones which in fact 
latched on to actual regularities in nature’ (1980: 40).  Consider, once again, the case of the 
feather when it falls under everyday conditions.  In such cases, Clarke notes, most ‘scientists 
don’t hesitate to claim that the universal law of gravity continues to apply’, even though they 
are ‘unable to incorporate the force of gravity and the forces of wind in an accurate model’ 
(2010: 302).25  Yet this does not reveal anything about the world as it is independent of science 
(see Clarke 2010: 313-4).  If scientists do suppose that regularities hold outside the conditions 
under which they are identified, this may amount to no more than a promissory note, 
indicating an expectation that science will one day be able to model how forces combine in 
open systems.26  Even if the supposition is based on a belief that the world consists of real 
causal powers, Van Fraassen regards such beliefs as supererogatory.  At the heart of his 
position is a contention that observable phenomena cannot adjudicate the truth or falsity of 
claims about causal powers (1980: 2) and hence that we can remain agnostic about such 
claims.  
  
                                                          
25 Clarke is actually discussing Neurath’s example of a falling bank note, but the idea is the 
same. 
26 Cartwright (1999) identifies yet another possibility – that scientific laws only hold locally (see 
also Cartwright 2010). 
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Whether persuaded by Van Fraassen’s arguments or not, readers may wonder how this 
somewhat abstruse metaphysical debate is relevant to causal inquiry in IR.  If so, then, once 
again, that is my point – whereas critical realists argue that an embrace of SR will open up new 
possibilities for causal inquiry in IR, it is not clear that embracing causal realism rather than 
remaining agnostic will make this kind of difference.  Consider an example of a scientific 
explanation provided by Van Fraassen: of why the conductor in a power station was warped 
following a short circuit.  He shows how, given information about the momentary current 
produced by the short circuit, the size and orientation of the conductor, and the size of the 
earth’s electro-magnetic field, the ‘theory of electro-magnetism allows us to calculate the 
force exerted on the conductor at the time’ of the short circuit (1980: 102).  In his example, 
doing this calculation reveals that the surge in current generated a significant increase in the 
downward force exerted on the (horizontal) conductor by the earth’s electro-magnetic field.  
This leads him to argue that the warping is explained by the short circuit.27  Expressed in 
everyday terms, he argues that the short circuit caused the warping.  The question I am posing 
is: what difference does it make if we construe this language of causes and forces as latching 
on to real causal powers, as compared to remaining agnostic on this matter? 
 
This question may be illuminated by contrasting Van Fraassen’s position to that of Nancy 
Cartwright, a scientific realist who has been particularly prominent in pushing the case for 
causal realism, especially against Van Fraassen.  She argues that causal claims about forces 
such as electro-magnetism ‘are best rendered as ascriptions of capacity’ (1989: 141).  She 
would therefore treat the claim that the short circuit caused the conductor to warp as invoking 
a causal capacity (or power) in nature which was responsible for the outcome – a capacity of 
                                                          
27 This is conditional on certain pragmatic assumptions about what kind of explanation is being 
sought (1980: 141-2; see also above). 
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electro-magnetic fields, under the right conditions, to produce the kind of warping observed in 
the conductor.  This is consistent with Wight’s stipulation that an explanation should provide 
‘an account of how the underlying mechanisms work’ (2006: 32).  Van Fraassen, by contrast, 
would be more modest.  He would interpret the proffered explanation as accounting for the 
observed outcome by reference to, and in the language of, a widely accepted scientific theory 
which makes particular claims about the properties of electro-magnetic fields.  He would, 
however, remain agnostic as to whether those properties reflect underlying causal capacities 
in nature. 
 
This suggests that in thinking about the difference that causal realism makes it is helpful to 
distinguish two kinds of question.  The first concerns what explains (or caused) a specific 
outcome – in this case, the warping.  On this question, Van Fraassen and Cartwright will give 
the same answer: it was the short circuit, given the earth’s electro-magnetic field.  The second 
concerns why the regularities identified by the theories put to work in such explanations hold.  
On this question, Van Fraassen and Cartwright will give different answers.  Whereas Cartwright 
will say that regularities in electrical phenomena hold in virtue of the causal capacities that 
produce them, Van Fraassen will acknowledge that some scientists certainly describe things in 
these terms, but will prefer to remain agnostic about whether such capacities are features of 
the world as it is independent of science. 
 
As with their epistemological difference over the extent of belief required to accept a scientific 
theory, this metaphysical difference between constructive empiricism and SR is philosophically 
significant.  However, insofar as Van Fraassen and Cartwright accept the same theories and put 
them to work in relation to the same problems, they are likely to offer the same explanations.  
It is, in other words, far from obvious that embracing causal realism will make a substantive 
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difference for causal inquiry.  Certainly, scientific realists in IR have not demonstrated that it 
does make such a difference, for their presumption has been that empiricists are unable to 
accept the same theories and offer the same explanations as scientific realists.  This is not true 
of the kind of empiricism defended in contemporary philosophy of science. 
 
What’s at stake for causal inquiry in IR? 
Critical realists in IR construe empiricism as being differentiated from SR both by the kinds of 
theories it can accept and also, consequently, by the scientific method it endorses, viz. the 
search for regularities in the world around us.  This makes it appear that the difference 
between the two positions has substantive implications for causal inquiry in IR.  However, in 
contemporary philosophy of science empiricists and scientific realists do not systematically 
disagree either about which theories should be accepted or about the practice of scientific 
inquiry.  Their epistemological and metaphysical differences lead them to offer competing 
interpretations of scientific practice (specifically: of the aims of science, of the extent of belief 
required to accept scientific theories, and of what science reveals about underlying causal 
powers), but they do not offer competing prescriptions for it.  Viewing the realist-empiricist 
debate in philosophy of science as a binary confrontation between philosophical systems, each 
with a distinctive methodology corollary, is therefore misleading. 
 
Wendt appears to recognize this when he observes that ‘realist and anti-realist physicists 
disagree about the ontological status of quarks, but this does not affect their research’.  He 
argues, however, that this kind of disagreement does affect research in the social sciences.  
This is because ‘social scientists are less confident than physicists about what their practice 
should look like, and have often turned to philosophers for methodological guidance’ (1999: 
48).  However, he describes social scientists as turning to outdated forms of anti-realism, 
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notably logical empiricism (see also Shapiro and Wendt 1992; Chernoff 2002: 199).  Whatever 
problems this generates do not argue for SR, as compared to empiricism, but only against 
outdated forms of anti-realism which Van Fraassen also repudiates. 
 
This undermines the case for a philosophical revolution in IR in which empiricism is replaced by 
SR.  On the one hand, because critical realists base their rejection of empiricism on positions 
that empiricists also repudiate, they have failed to make a compelling case that whatever 
problems they identify in mainstream approaches to causal inquiry are problems of empiricism 
per se.  As my discussion of Van Fraassen’s constructive empiricism has shown, the kind of 
‘neopositivist’ methodology to which critical realists object is not a necessary counterpart to 
an empiricist philosophy of science.  On the other hand, because critical realists in IR tend to 
suppose that the epistemological and metaphysical differences between SR and empiricism 
have a clear methodological corollary, they have failed to show that such differences matter in 
their own right, when this methodological corollary is absent.  In short, they have failed to 
show that SR would make a difference as compared to the kind of empiricism defended in 
contemporary philosophy of science.28 
 
My objections to scientific realists’ calls for a philosophical revolution in IR do not, however, 
call into question the substance of their critique of mainstream practices of causal inquiry.  
Quite the contrary!  Indeed, a key insight that emerges from engaging with contemporary 
empiricist philosophy of science is the following: to the extent that the critical realist argument 
against mainstream practices of causal inquiry in IR is based on the ways in which such 
practices deviate from the model of scientific inquiry employed in natural science, it is a 
                                                          
28 Critical realists might argue that their critical orientation enables them to ask questions that 
empiricists cannot, but they have not established this case against constructive empiricism. 
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critique that empiricists can and should join them in advancing.  For if SR and constructive 
empiricism share a common understanding of scientific practice, then any departure from that 
practice in IR constitutes a challenge to empiricism as much as to SR.  What is at stake in 
critical realist arguments against empiricism in IR is therefore not whether those conducting 
causal inquiry are scientific realists.29  What is at stake is a methodological question – to what 
extent do the presuppositions which underpin mainstream approaches to causal inquiry 
depart from the practice of natural science as understood by both scientific realists and 
empiricists, why, and with what consequences? 
 
Although I can, in the space available, only begin to sketch the issues this raises, a key concern 
arises in relation to Kurki’s observation that mainstream approaches to causal inquiry in IR are 
organized around the search for regularities in the world around us, that is, in everyday world 
politics.  As noted above, Van Fraassen agrees with scientific realists (i) that experimentation is 
crucial for identifying scientifically significant regularities (which may not be observable in 
everyday life), (ii) that scientific theories (may) make existential assertions about unobservable 
entities, and (iii) that in order to explain something it is insufficient simply to subsume it under 
a regularity.  By contrast, although mainstream approaches to causal inquiry in IR are often 
thought of as empiricist, they diverge from this philosophical consensus on all three counts. 
 
I have already provided examples of mainstream theorists treating regularities observed in 
everyday world politics as causally significant.  Demands that the search for such regularities 
should constitute a central component of causal inquiry are also prominent in the research 
methods literature.  For example, Gerring contends that ‘a mechanismic argument without an 
                                                          
29 This is confirmed by the fact that scholars such as Bennett (2013) and Mearsheimer and Walt 
(2013) endorse both SR and the kind of neopositivist methodology that critical realists reject. 
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appeal to covariational patterns between X and Y does not make any sense … to talk about 
mechanisms is also, necessarily, to talk about covariational patterns (“correlations”)’ (2005: 
166).30  Meanwhile, although King, Keohane, and Verba describe the view that ‘unobservable 
concepts’ have ‘no place in scientific research’ as ‘untenable’, they nevertheless argue that we 
‘should choose observable, rather than unobservable, concepts wherever possible’.  They hold, 
moreover, that ‘[e]xplanations involving concepts such as culture or national interest or utility 
or motivation are suspect unless we can measure the concept independently’ (1994: 41, 109-
10; see also Johnson 2006: 228).  Although they do not defend an explicit model of 
explanation, this suggests, in turn, that causal explanations must be rooted in observable 
patterns of cross-case covariation. 
 
These methodological demands are, moreover, made in the name of ‘scientific research’ (King, 
Keohane, and Verba 1994: 7).  Jackson exposes the potential problem with such claims – 
appeals to ‘science’ in IR tend to serve ‘a disciplining function’, privileging particular modes of 
inquiry in the name of ‘science’ (2011: 9-10).  He argues, therefore, that the problem with 
King, Keohane, and Verba’s invocation of ‘science’ is that they prescribe a logic of inquiry 
which they claim is applicable to ‘all good research’ (1994: 4), whereas really what they are 
prescribing is a logic of inquiry for ‘all good neopositivist research’ (Jackson 2011: 67).  Yet the 
reality is starker than Jackson suggests, for a comparison of their prescriptions with Van 
Fraassen’s understanding of scientific inquiry reveals the extent to which their prescriptions 
depart even from contemporary empiricist philosophy of science.  We are, in short, confronted 
with a hegemonic practice which departs considerably from the closest supporting arguments 
                                                          
30 At best, this holds only in relation to closed systems. 
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in philosophy of science, but with very little explicit defence of that departure – indeed, very 
little acknowledgment of it.31 
 
It seems reasonable, therefore, to ask those who employ and defend mainstream approaches 
to causal inquiry in IR to consider how Van Fraassen’s reformulation of empiricism might speak 
to their own practices.  In light of the preceding discussion, three areas stand out as deserving 
closer consideration: 
1. How do the regularities sought in mainstream approaches to causal inquiry in IR (viz., 
those observable in everyday world politics) differ from the kinds of regularities sought in 
natural science and with what consequences for causal inquiry? 
2. Given Van Fraassen’s acceptance that unobservable entities are routinely incorporated 
into scientific theories and that references to them should be construed literally, what is 
the rationale for seeking to avoid incorporating into social scientific theories factors which 
cannot be directly measured, such as ‘intentions, meanings and understandings’ (Wight 
2006: 60)? 
3. Given the established deficiencies of the covering-law model of explanation, what account 
of casual explanation is endorsed, and how do patterns of cross-case covariation feed into 
it? 
 
In posing these question, I do not mean to imply that powerful answers cannot be provided.  It 
is, though, pertinent to note that these are all areas in which there has been innovative work 
by philosophically-oriented scholars in IR, both from a critical realist perspective and from 
alternative perspectives (see, for example, Patomäki 2002; Wight 2006; Kurki 2008; Jackson 
                                                          
31 King, Keohane, and Verba explicitly sidestep philosophical issues (1994: 3, 6; cf Johnson 
2006). 
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2011; Grynaviski 2013; Lebow 2014; Humphreys 2017b; Jackson 2017; Patomäki 2017).  I have 
shown that recognizing the extent of the challenge this work provides to mainstream 
approaches to causal inquiry in IR does not require the adoption of SR and repudiation of 
empiricism.  It is not open to those who defend mainstream approaches to say that such 
considerations do not apply to them because mainstream approaches are empiricist.  In all 
three areas, contemporary empiricist philosophy of science has more in common with SR than 
with the presuppositions which appear to underpin mainstream practices of causal inquiry in 
IR. 
 
Conclusion 
To many, SR may be intuitively attractive.  Many scientists will believe that (some of) the 
unobservable entities postulated in their theories are real and that scientific theories identify 
real causal powers in the world as it is independent of science.  From the point of view of the 
debate between SR and constructive empiricism, however, this is beside the point.  What is 
directly at stake in that debate is not what scientists in fact believe, but rather (i) the extent of 
belief required  to accept a scientific theory, that is, whether scientists are rationally compelled 
to be entity realists and (ii) whether scientists must be causal realists, that is, conceive of 
science as identifying real causal powers.  The question for IR is what difference, if any, the 
divergent stances taken on these issues by scientific realists and empiricists make for the 
conduct of causal inquiry. 
 
I have argued that the critical realist call for a philosophical revolution in which SR replaces 
empiricism as the basis for causal inquiry in IR is misleading as to the methodological 
significance of the philosophical differences between SR and empiricism.  One reason this has 
not been recognized in IR is that the extent to which empiricist philosophy of science has been 
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renewed to meet the scientific realist challenge has been neglected, not only by critical realists 
but also, more importantly, by those who advocate most strongly that causal inquiry should 
seek to identify patterns of cross-case covariation and develop covering law explanations.  To 
the extent that scientific realists draw on philosophy of science to challenge such demands, it 
is a challenge that empiricists can and should join them in advancing. 
 
  
40 
 
Bibliography 
Bennett A (2013) The mother of all isms: Causal mechanisms and structured pluralism in 
International Relations theory.  European Journal of International Relations 19(3): 459-
81. 
Betts A and Pilath A (2017) The politics of causal claims: The case of environmental migration.  
Journal of International Relations and Development 20(4): 782-804. 
Bhaskar R (2008 [1975]) A Realist Theory of Science.  London: Verso. 
Bhaskar R (2015 [1979]) The Possibility of Naturalism: A Philosophical Critique of the 
Contemporary Human Sciences, 3rd ed.  London: Routledge. 
Cartwright N (1993) How the Laws of Physics Lie.  Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Cartwright N (1989) Nature’s Capacities and their Measurement.  Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Cartwright N (1999) The Dappled World: A Study of the Boundaries of Science.  Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Cartwright N (2010) What are randomised controlled trials good for?  Philosophical Studies 
147(1): 59-70. 
Chakravartty A (2007) A Metaphysics for Scientific Realism: Knowing the Unobservable.  
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Chakravartty A (2011) Scientific realism.  Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.  Available at 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-realism/ (accessed 7 April 2016).  
Chernoff F (2002) Scientific realism as a meta-theory of international politics.  International 
Studies Quarterly 46(2): 189-207. 
Chernoff F (2007) Critical realism, scientific realism, and International Relations theory.  
Millennium: Journal of International Studies 35(2): 399-407. 
Chernoff F (2009a) Conventionalism as an adequate basis for policy-relevant IR theory.  
European Journal of International Relations 15(1):157-94. 
41 
 
Chernoff F (2009b) The ontological fallacy: A rejoinder on the status of scientific realism in 
International Relations.  Review of International Studies 35(2): 371-95. 
Chernoff F (2014) Explanation and Progress in Security Studies: Bridging Theoretical Divides in 
International Relations.  Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
Clarke S (2010) Transcendental realisms in the philosophy of science: On Bhaskar and 
Cartwright.  Synthese 173(3): 299-315. 
Gerring J (2005) Causation: A unified framework for the social sciences.  Journal of Theoretical 
Politics 17(2): 163-98. 
Grynaviski (2013) Contrasts, counterfactuals, and causes.  European Journal of International 
Relations 19(4): 823-46. 
Guzzini S (2017) Power and cause.  Journal of International Relations and Development 20(4): 
737-59. 
Hempel CG (1966) Philosophy of Natural Science.  Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall. 
Holland PW (1986) Statistics and causal inference.  Journal of the American Statistical 
Association 81(396): 945-60. 
Humphreys ARC (2017a) Introduction: Problems of causation in world politics.  Journal of 
International Relations and Development 20(4): 659-66. 
Humphreys ARC (2017b) Causation, complexity and the Concert: The pragmatics of causal 
explanation in International Relations.  Journal of International Relations and 
Development 20(4): 717-36. 
Jackson PT (2011) The Conduct of Inquiry in International Relations: Philosophy of Science and 
its Implications for the Study of World Politics.  London: Routledge. 
Jackson PT (2017) Causal claims and causal explanation in international studies.  Journal of 
International Relations and Development 20(4): 689-716. 
42 
 
Johnson J (2006) Consequences of positivism: A pragmatist assessment.  Comparative Political 
Studies 39(2): 224-52. 
Joseph J (2007) Philosophy in International Relations: A scientific realist approach.  Millennium: 
Journal of International Studies 35(2): 345-59. 
Joseph J and Wight C (2010) Scientific Realism and International Relations.  Basingstoke: 
Palgrave. 
King G, Keohane RO and Verba S (1994) Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in 
Qualitative Research.  Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Kurki M (2006) Causes of a divided discipline: Rethinking the concept of cause in International 
Relations theory.  Review of International Studies 32(2): 189-216. 
Kurki M (2008) Causation in International Relations: Reclaiming Causal Analysis.  Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Kurki M (2017) Causality, Democracy Support and the Cult of the Factish Gods.  Journal of 
International Relations and Development 20(4): 760-81. 
Ladyman J, Douven I, Horsten L and Van Fraassen B (1997) A defence of Van Fraassen’s critique 
of abductive inference: Reply to Psillos.  Philosophical Quarterly 47(188): 305-21. 
Lebow RN (2014) Constructing Cause in International Relations.  Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Marsh D and Furlong P (2002) A skin, not a sweater: Ontology and epistemology in political 
science.  In: Marsh D and Stoker G (eds) Theory and Methods in Political Science.  2nd 
ed.  Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp.17-41. 
Mearsheimer JJ and Walt SM (2013) Leaving theory behind: Why simplistic hypothesis testing 
is bad for International Relations.  European Journal of International Relations 19(3): 
427-57. 
43 
 
Patomäki H (2002) After International Relations: Critical Realism and the (Re)Construction of 
World Politics.  London: Routledge. 
Patomäki H (2017) Praxis, politics and the future: A dialectical critical realist account of world-
historical causation.  Journal of International Relations and Development 20(4): 805-25. 
Patomäki H and Wight C (2000) After postpositivism?  The promises of critical realism.  
International Studies Quarterly 44(2): 213-37. 
Ray, JL (1995) Democracy and International Conflict: An Evaluation of the Democratic Peace 
Proposition.  Columbia: University of South Carolina Press. 
Rosen G (1994) What is constructive empiricism?  Philosophical Studies 74(2): 143-78. 
Sekhon JJ (2004) Quality meets quantity: Case studies, conditional probability, and 
counterfactuals.  Perspectives on Politics 2(2): 281-93. 
Shapiro I and Wendt A (1992) The difference that realism makes: Social science and the politics 
of consent.  Politics and Society 20(2): 197-223. 
Sil R and Katzenstein PJ (2010) Analytic eclecticism in the study of world politics: Reconfiguring 
problems and mechanisms across research traditions.  Perspectives on Politics 8(2): 
411-31. 
Smith S (1996) Positivism and beyond.  In: Smith S, Booth K and Zalewski M (eds) International 
Theory: Positivism and Beyond.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp.11-44. 
Suganami H (2008) Narrative explanation and International Relations: Back to basics.  
Millennium: Journal of International Studies 37(2): 327-56. 
Van Evera S (1997) Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science.  Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press. 
Van Fraassen BC (1980) The Scientific Image.  Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
44 
 
Van Fraassen BC (1985) Empiricism in the philosophy of science.  In: Churchland PM and 
Hooker CA (eds) Images of Science: Essays on Realism and Empiricism, with a Reply 
from Bas C. van Fraassen.  Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp.245-308. 
Van Fraassen BC (1989) Laws and Symmetry.  Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Van Fraassen BC (1993) Armstrong, Cartwright, and Earman on Laws and Symmetry.  
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53(2): 431-44. 
Van Fraassen BC (2001) Constructive empiricism now.  Philosophical Studies 106(1/2): 151-70. 
Van Fraassen BC (2002) The Empirical Stance.  New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Van Fraassen BC (2008) Scientific Representation: Paradoxes of Perspective.  Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Waltz KN (1979) Theory of International Politics.  New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Wendt AE (1987) The agent-structure problem in International Relations theory.  International 
Organization 41(3): 335-70. 
Wendt A (1999) Social Theory of International Politics.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Wight C (2006) Agents, Structures and International Relations: Politics as Ontology.  
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Wight C (2007) A manifesto for scientific realism in IR: Assuming the can-Opener won’t work!  
Millennium: Journal of International Studies 35(2): 379-98. 
 
